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COTTON GINNING INDUSTRY IN KENYA: THE CASE OF THE 




This paper examines the developments in the cooperative owned 
ginneries in Kenya from the mid 1970's, when the transition to the 
cooperative ownership mode took pla*e, up tc the present day. In parti-
cular the study is concerned with surveying the impact of the cooper-
ative ownership and management structures for the industrial performance 
in the cotton ginning sector in Kenya. It will be shown that many of the 
problems the cooperative ginneries have been facing, can be directly con-
nected to the cooperative ownership and management mode, and can be 
analyzed separately from the general problems of the industry. It is 
argued that the success or failure in dealing with these cooperative-
specific problems will be one of the key factors affeoting the euc»ess 
of those policies which aim at reviving the cotton industry in Kenya. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to examine the developments in the 
cooperative-owned Western Kenyan ginneries from the mid 1970's, when the 
transition to the cooperative ownership mode took place, up to the present 
day. In particular the study is concerned with surveying the impact of 
the cooperative ownership and management structures for the industrial 
performance in the cotton ginning sector over the period under consider-
ation. The present study is a part of a larger research project, which 
aims at measuring the impact of the indigenous ownership and management 
structures for the performance of the industrial companies in Kenya. 
This work-in-progress-paper will concentrate on presenting the evidence 
collected during the field research concerning Kenya's cotton production 
in general and the cooperative ginning activities in particular. To 
avoid unnecessary prolonging on this paper, the theoretical background 
discussions on different ownership modes and those concerning the history 
of Kenya's cooperative movement as well as discussions on the general 
methodology of this research project will be presented in the forthcoming 
papers and finally in the thesis itself. 
The analysis of this paper is structured in the following way. 
First, as the background information, the structure and main develop-
ments in Kenya's cotton sector are presented. We shall then introduce 
the cooperative unions operating cotton ginneries in Western Kenya, and 
estimate the potential viability of the ginning operations in these 
unions. Then their financial performance will be analyzed. Next, we 
present the evidence concerning the factors which explain the trends in 
their financial, management and production performance. Last, based on 
the evidence of the study, we aim at drawing conclusions of the impact 
of the cooperative ownership and management mode oh the cotton processing 
activities and on the performance of the cotton industry in Western Kenya. 
5L Background: Cotton Industry in Kenya 
The cultivation of the cotton plant of Mallow family started as 
early as 3000 BC in the Indus Valley and in Peru before 2500 BC. The 
commercial value of the plant comes from its unicellular, flattened and 
twisted hairs, which provide soft fibre to be used as raw material in the 
textile industry, and from its seeds, which provide valuable oil for the 
food and chemical industries. Cotton is not purely a tropical plant; 
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its cultivation extends from latitude ^7 degrees north to 28 degrees 
south of the equator. As the cotton plant has a tap-root of 2-3 m in 
length, it needs a deep, well aerated soil, not too rich in mineral 
salts. During early period of its development it requires sufficient 
amounts of water, but a definite feature in its cultivation is that it 
needs after that a longish dry period, as heavy rains are deleterious for 
mature cotton balls. For this reason cotton competes only marginally 
with such plants as sugar cane, the present biggest commercial crop in 
Western Kenya, which needs a mere constant supply of rain throughout the 
cultivation period. 
Cotton is one of the important commercial crops in the world 
with an annual production of approximately 20 million tons. The four 
biggest producers, Soviet Union, China, USA and India, produce together 
around half this amount. In Africa, the biggest producers are Egypt 
(approx. 0.5 million tons per year in the early 1980"s) and Sudan (0.15 
million tons per year). In Kenya, cotton is not nowadays among the 
leading cash crops, and the production is small compared to the output of 
the major world producers. The contribution of cotton production, process-
ing and marketing to Kenya's GNP in the mid of our focal period in 1980 
was less than 1 per cent. Gross value of production amounted to approxi-
mately Ksh 130.U million (USD 13 .0 million) for seed cotton production and 
Kshs 62.8 million (USD 6.3 million) for marketing and ginning . Despite 
cotton's small share in the domestic production, it has been important for 
the development of Kenya's marginal areas and especially for Western and 
Nyanza Provinces, where farmers have until recently had few cash crop 
alternatives. Cotton is exclusively a smallholder crop and an estimated 
100.000 families (about 3-k% of rural population) got in the early 1980's 
their main cash income from its cultivation. 
Cotton production in Kenya started around 1903-1907, and the in-
troduction of this crop coincided with two other developments. These are 
the introduction of the 'hut-tax' for the Africans by the colonial govern-
ment in 1900, which increased the need to produce cash crops also in the 
African households, and the opening of the Uganda railway from Mombasa to 
2 Kisumu in 1901, which opened Western Kenya for commercial agriculture. 
1 The World Bank (1982): p: 11. 
2 
For the early history of cotton production in Western Kenya, see M.J. Hay 
(1972): Economic Change in Luoland: Kowe 1890-19^5, PhD Thesis, University 
of Wisconsin. 
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The first area of cultivation was in Western Kenya by Winam Gulf on Lake 
Victoria, commonly known as the Lake Basin, where much of the area satis-
fies the soil and weather conditions for cotton production. Most of the 
high potential cotton land is situated in the present South Nyanza, 
Kisumu, Siaya, Busia and Bungoma districts, and these districts form the 
main focal area of this study. 
From Western Kenya cotton farming spread in the early 1920's to 
the Coastal strip bordering the Indian Ocean, and in the 1930's to lowlands 
of Eastern and Central Provinces. In Rift Valley, cotton growing started 
in the mid 1970's. 
By 19^0, cotton was among the three most important African crops 
in Kenya. However, despite official support, cotton production rarely 
exceeded 15.000 tons per year due to inability to control pests; climatic 
and market variability; and farmers' need to ensure a good food crop 
before devoting time and energy to cotton production. 
These conditions remained virtually unchanged during the period 
immediately after Kenya's independence in 1963. Appendix 1 provides a 
3 . . . detailed account of seed cotton production by provinces in Kenya during 
the years 1965-1988. Cotton production continued at the pre-independence 
level of 15.000-17.000 tons per year throughout the 1960's and early 1970's. 
At this stage the Kenya Government policies for the cotton production 
changed for various reasons. The demand for cotton lint had increased 
with the growing of Kenya's textile industry, and because of its chronic 
stagnation, the cotton sub-sector could not supply the adequate raw mate-
rial from local sources. The country had to rely on supplies of lint from 
the neighboring Uganda and Tanzania. However, these soft currency imports 
had become much more problematic by the mid 1970's, as the political ten-
sion between Kenya and Tanzania caused the closing of the border in 1976 
and the political instability in Uganda made it a very unreliable trade 
partner. As a result the Kenyan Government launched a programme called the 
Cotton Development Programme (CDP) in 1975 in order to achieve self-
sufficiency in cotton production. The CDP concentrated on increasing in-
centives for the farmers to cultivate cotton and on removing production 
constraints. The key elements of this strategy included : (a) raising 
producer prices by 80% between 1975 and 1979; (b) supplying seeds for plant-
ing free of charge; and (c) launching seasonal credit programmes to provide 
3 
The crop is called seed cotton before it is ginned to cotton lint and 
cotton seeds. 
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farmers with pesticides and tractor ploughing services . Much as a 
cumulative result of these incentives, the cotton production in Kenya 
doubled between 1975 and 1979, from 15.000 tons per years to more than 
30.000 tons. 
From 1980 onwards the trends in cotton production have been less 
favorable. The production started to fall already in 1980 and this fall 
culminated in the bad drought year of 1983A. During the season 198^/85, 
exceptionally good weather conditions in Eastern and Central Provinces 
produced the best cotton crop in Kenya's history, but this rise proved 
to be a short one. Since 1985, the production of seed cotton has declined 
back to l8.000-19.000 tons per year level, which are similar to the figures 
of the early 1970's and also to those of most years in the 1930's and 
19^0's. As new large areas have been simultaneously brought under cotton 
cultivation in the Hola and Bura irrigation schemes, the present trends 
have been seen as very unsatisfactory by the Kenyan Government. As the 
country produces now an average 30.000 bales of cotton lint annually and 
i 5 
the annual demand of local textile industry is approximately 50.000 bales , 
Kenya has had to use large amounts of its scarce foreign currency for 
imports of lint. At the same time the textile industry has continuously 
complained about the declining quality of lint they are receiving from 
local ginneries. 
For the traditionally leading cotton production area of Western 
and Nyanza Provinces, where both the buying and ginning operations have _ 
been conducted by the cooperatives, the development in the seed cotton 
supply in the 198#'s has been quite unsatisfactory. After the relatively 
good years of 1975-1981, the trends have been declining. The production 
has stayed on a very low level even after the weather improved after the 
drought of 1983/8H, and the production level of 3.000.000 kg in 1987/88 is 
the lowest since the 1920's. The estimates for the season 1988/89 do not 
promise any improvement. Cotton, once the third most important cash crop 
in Kenya's Western Province, has declined to its present seventh place 
amongst the cash crops. What is more alarming is that there has been not 
"E 7 
For a detailed account of the CDP, see the World Bank (1982): Cotton 
!Processing and Marketing Project. 
''The effective demand for lint by Kenya's 12 textile factories using cotton 
as an input was 3.^00 bales of lint per month during the first half of 1988 
(EA Report on Trade and Industry, June 1988). On the other hand, the demand 
for cotton seed by Kenya's 12 cotton seed crushing mills exceeds so much the 
cotton seed supply of the country that in 1985, the two biggest mills could 
have crushed the whole crop. It should be, however, noted, that most of 
these mills have such substitutes as sunflower seed, maize germ and copra, 
which can partly take the place of cotton seed as raw material. For further 
comments on cotton seed oil mills, see Dijkstra (1988). 
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only a shift to the other cash crops, but in some cases land has been left either 
idle or under poor cultivation in both Western and Nyanza Provinces after the 
cotton acreage has declined.^ 
What have been the reasons for this weak performance in the seed cotton 
production in Kenya in the 1980's? In its official view, the Kenya Government 
7 
lists three main reasons for these developments . First, the problems related to 
the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board (below the Cotton Board; or the Board; 
or CLSMB) have caused continuous delays in payments for seed cotton to the farmers. 
The Board has been functioning practically without any working capital and has 
financed its payments to farmers with bank overdrafts. As it has paid an average 
Kshs 23 million annually as interest for these overdrafts, its financial position 
has been extremely tight for the last 10 years. This has caused delays of over 
six months in payments to farmers for their crop. There is no doubt that this has 
been a major disincentive for the cotton production. M. Etyang, in his study of 
cotton production in Busia district, found a strong association between the length 
of time farmers waited for their payment and the lack of willingness to cultivate 
cotton during the next season.8 During the present study, similar behaviour pattern 
could be observed. 
The second reason given for the decline in the cotton production is the too 
low producer price for the crop. This is, however, a much more complicated issue 
than the first one. We have above noted that during the late 1970's, the producer 
price for cotton was raised considerably. Since 1979, the price to growers has 
been determined on the export parity basis as shown in Appendix 2. All costs in-
volved from the buying of the seed cotton to the transport of lint to port godowns 
are deducted from the world market fob Mombasa price to arrive to the amount of 
producer price. Whether this producer price has been adequate to make cotton com-
petitive compared to alternative crops has been a subject of much debate in Kenya. 
In the high potential cotton zones of Western Kenya, the ether main cash crops are 
9 
tobacco and vegetable seeds . The most important alternative has been tooacco, 
which is grown under the umbrella of BAT with a 'high input-high output1 approach 
Appendix 1+ shows that in Western Kenya, tobacco, when cultivated in this manner, 
can produce a gross margin of Ksh 6.000 per half hectare (the other half hectare 
must be used for the compulsory tree farming) , which is the 
Evidence of this was given by agricultural officers in both Nyanza and Western 
Provinces when interviewed during this study. 
7 
This issue has been widely covered in 'Report of the Intermmisterial Committee 
on the Domestic Textile Industry and Future Role of Cotton Lint and Seed Market-
ing Board', Republic of Kenya, January 1986. 
8 M. Etyang (1979): pp: 60-101. 
9 . 
Also, to a lesser degree robusta coffee. In the medium potential cotton zones, 
alternative crops include robusta coffee, sugar cane and citrus fruits, while 
in the low potential cotton zones the main competing crop has been sugar cane. 
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maximum area a family farm can put under tobacco and which exhausts most 
of the labour available for cash crops in these small farms. This Kshs 
6.000 should cover for all labour costs and profit for tobacco farming. 
In Appendix 3, similar figures are provided for cotton. However, when 
comparing cotton farming with other crops on realistic basis, it is crucial 
from the point of interest of this study to note that both in the late 1970's 
and today, the cotton production technologies vary enormously from farm in 
Western Kenya. In a study of cotton yields in the area, yields per hectare 
varied from 200 kg to 1500 kg depending on the use of farm inputs, especially 
on the spraying of the cotton plants against insects and pests.During 
our research, a demonstration plot with high input utilization produced 
over 1.000 kg of seed cotton per hectare in Busia district. At the same 
time the average yield per hectare for the cooperative farmers in the Malaba/ 
Malakisi zone was as low as 162 kg per hectare, and much lower yields were 
recorded. For comparisons with the other crops, these yield variations 
make all the difference as shewn in Appendix 3. The cotton margin figure 
show that a high input approach produces fairly similar gross margins to 
tobacco, and as tobacco is more labour intensive, high input cotton is a 
competitive alternative to tobacco production. It is also quite clear that 
the low input approach to cotton production does not pay well if it pays 
at all. The problem with Western Kenyan cotton production, and a major 
reason for the low crop figures, is that only an estimated 10-20$ of 
cotton is sprayed against pests at all, while in the irrigation schemes in 
Ilola and Bura the spraying coverage is almost total. One study estimated 
that in 1983, only one to two per cent of the small-scale farmers in Busia 
used anything like a 'high input-high output' approach in their cotton 
production"'""'". Interviews with cotton production experts connected this 
situation not only to farmers' disillusions of the cotton industry, but 
also to the 'social problems' of agriculture in Western Kenya, where tradi-
tion is weak for intensive use of inputs in farming, and good yields of 
any crop are in most cases produced only where cultivation is done under 
very tightly controlled circumstances, such as prevail in the Mumias sugar 
12 . . . zone and m BAT-controlled tobacco production . As a conclusion it is 
reasonable to say at least, that although the producer price for seed 
cotton is an important incentive for cotton growing, the wide variations 
in the yields indicate that there is considerable potential for increased 
cotton production through the introduction of good husbandry techniques. 
1 0 A Study of Policies for Development of the Cotton Sub-sector, CLSMB, 1986. 
Economic and Financial Feasibility Study of Luanda FCU, 198^, by Deloitte 
Haskins and Sells. 
12 Interviews with Production Officer, the Cotton Board, and Planning Officer, 
the Kenya National Federation of Cooperatives. 
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The third main reason given for the decreased cotton crops especi-
ally in Western Kenya has been the poor performance of the cooperative 
societies and unions, which have acted as agents to the Cotton Board in 
buying and ginning of cotton as well as in administrating seasonal farm 
input credit to farmers since the mid 1970's. The performance of these 
cooperatives and their impact on the cotton industry will be the subject 
of analysis in the following sections of this study. 
After these comments on the cotton cultivation in Kenya, let us now 
look at how the industry is organized above the farming level. According to 
law3 all cotton bought from Kenya's farmers belongs to the Cotton Board. 
Seed cotton is bought directly from the farmers by the Board, or it is bought 
through its agents, i.e. the cooperative societies and the private ginners. 
The agents,get a buying commission as a compensation for their work; this 
has been Kshs 0.25 per kg for the last six years. During normal years, co-
operative societies are able to buy 95$ of Kenya's seed cotton, but because 
of management problems in the societies, the Board has in various cases in 
the 1900's interfered, and bought cotton direct from the farmers. At the 
same time, both the cooperatives and the private buyers have continuously 
complained that the buying commission is inadequate to cover the buying 
expenses, and that the Cotton Board has in many cases delayed their payment 
of the commission. 
From the buying stations the seed cotton is transported by private 
or cooperative lorries and again on commission basis, to the processing 
factories, the cotton ginneries. As these ginneries are the focal points 
in our study, we shall now briefly look at what happens in these factories 
as the seed cotton is processed. In all ginneries in Kenya, the seed 
cotton is fed manually to the gin stands, or shortly gins. The gins 
operating in Kenya, with the exception of the Malindi single roller 
ginnery, are of the dcuble roller type, which draws the lint fibre across 
fixed knives while the action of moving reciprocating knives severs the 
fibre from the cotton seed. The separated seeds are collected into bags 
and used for planting during the next season or transported to oil mills 
for further processing. The lint drops from the gins on to the floor in 
front of the gin stands, from where it is collected manually and taken to 
the baling press. The baling press produces bales of cotton lint weighing 
185 kg each. The handling of bales is, without exception, manual in Kenya. 
The bales are kept in the ginnery stores until they are collected by the 
Cotton Board and taken to the Board's godowns and finally to the textile 
mills. 
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The objectives of the ginner to the cotton industry are of two 
different natures. The first is to make the best of the seed cotton which 
the grower presents for processing, as the price paid to the grower for 
the seed cotton will in the future reflect the prices obtained for the 
lint. The second objective is, while ginning, to give the cotton the 
minimum reduction in fibre spinning quality, so that the lint fibre 
produced will meet the requirements of its ultimate users - the spinner, 
the textile manufacturer and the consumer. To be able to do this, the 
managers of the ginnery should apart from adequate skills in general and 
financial management, also possess sufficient technical knowledge to main-
tain machinery and equipment> to make adjustments to settings to suit the 
type and style of cotton, to control rates of throughput for optimum results, 
to control moisture content in the cotton, and to produce a well-wrapped 
pressed bale acceptable to the textile mills. 
The first ginneries in Kenya were established by Kenyans of Asian 
origin in the beginning of this century and the Asians remained the sole 
owners of ginneries until the late 196o's. Under the indigenization poli-
cies of the 1970's (see more of this in the following sections), six Asians 
owned ginneries were bought by the cooperative unions in the 1970's in 
Western and Nyanza Provinces. At the same time, the Government by means of 
CLSMB expanded its own participation in the ginning industry and established 
six ginneries mainly in Eastern and Central Provinces, one of them in 
shared ownership with the local cooperative societies which have been 
dormant for the last six years. Two ginneries at the Coast and one in 
Kitui district in Eastern Province have remained in private, non-indigenous 
Kenyan ownership. Appendix 5 gives a record of Kenya's ginneries, their 
ownership and capacities. Appendix 6 provides an account of the bales of 
lint ginned in each ginnery between 197^/75 and 1987/88. The production 
levels reflect of course the figures for the seed cotton production pre-
sented in Appendix 1. The ginneries conduct their ginning on commission 
basis to the Cotton Board. This cor,mission was during the time of our 
study Kshs 2.00 per kilo of lint ginned. This should cover all expenses 
in ginning and also the entrepreneur's profit. That the private ginners 
have remained in the sector for 70 years would indicate that the commission 
has been adequate to compensate for expenses, if the ginning is done effec-
tively. 
The lint and cotton seed produced is the property of the Board. It 
sells the lint to textile millers and the seed to oil millers in public 
auctions. The price of lint is determined by a cost-plus system, not through 
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normal auctioning. In addition to the tasks already mentioned in this 
section, the Cotton Board also has had the responsibility f'or the general 
development of the cotton industry in Kenya. 
) 
As we have already indicated, the performance of the whole cotton 
industry in the 1980's has not satisfied the Kenya Government. In addition 
to the farming problems, the performance of most ginneries has been 
regarded as inefficient, and the CLSMB has been seen as a weak institution 
to develop the cotton sector. As a result of the problems facing the 
industry, the Kenyan Cabinet decided in 1985 to set up an Interministerial 
Committee to study the situation and make recommendations on the best 13 
methods to solve the problems . Based on the recommendations of this 
Committee and following discussions in the Parliament, a new Cotton 
Act was passed in July 1988. The new Act, which has not yet been imple-
mented, made the following changes to the organization of the cotton industry, 
which are of relevance for this study: 
1) All the Board-owned ginneries will be sold to the cooperatives 
and/or the private buyers. 
2) The cotton lint will be sold at regular auctions, organized by 
the Board. The price will be fixed by normal auctioning. 
3) Farmers will receive a first payment on delivery of the seed 
cotton. The final payment will depend on the results of 
auctioning. 
k) The Board will no longer directly be involved in buying, 
transport or storage activities, which will be a responsibility 
of the cooperatives or private ginners. 
As it is too early to estimate impact of these changes for the 
cotton production levels in the future, we shall comment on the first 
point above concerning the ownership of the ginneries, which is much re-
lated to the subject of this study. The 1988 Cotton Act has been seen as 
one of the first moves in the new policies aiming at the restructuring and 
privatization of Kenya's economy. The Act states that the Board-owned 
ginneries will be owned either by private ginners, or cooperative unions 
or societies. In discussions in the Parliament before the Act was passed 
and in subsequent discussions concerning the implementation of the Act, it 
13 . ' . The report of the Committee's findings was presented to the Cabinet m 
January 1986. 
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has become quite clear that 'private ownership' means in most cases co-
operative ownership and the farmers' organizations are the natural and 
politically the only acceptable owners of these agro-processing facili-
. ll+ . . . . ties . As this discussion of the ownership mode and its implications for 
the development of the cotton industry coincides with the publishing of 
the results of the present study, we shall in the last section of this 
paper make comments concerning the present cotton policies in Kenya and 
evaluate their realism against the evidence of our research. 
After this introduction to the cotton industry in Kenya we are 
now ready to start our analysis of the impact of the cooperative ownership 
and management mode for the performance of the ginneries and for the 
general development of the cotton sector in the country. 
3. Performance of Cooperative Ginneries in Kenya 
A Introduction 
In this section we analyze how those cooperative unions, which 
own cotton ginneries in Western Kenya, have performed since they took over 
these factories from their previous Kenyan-Asian owners in the 1970's. 
The data presented here covers all the cooperative ginneries except the 
one owned by Malaba/Malakisi Farmers Cooperative Union Ltd. The Malakisi 
case differs from the others, as together with the ginnery, the union 
bought also a soap plant and an oil mill. As the Malakisi case will be 
a subject of another paper related to this research project, it suffices 
to say here that the performance of the cooperative Malakisi industries 
has in most aspects been similar to the performance of the five ginneries 
which are discussed in this paper. Some comments concerning the Malakisi 
case are, however, added to the present paper, as they have been considered 
to have explanatory value for the present case. 
Table 1 below gives the basic facts of the five cooperative unions 
in Kenya which operate cotton ginneries. All these ginneries are from 
the 1920's and 1930's, and they were purchased from Asian family firms in 
the mid 1970's by the cooperative unions"1"^ . These take-overs were part 
m : . 
These views favouring cooperatives were reiterated by the interviewed politi-
cians, CLSMB officers and civil servants during this research in 1989. It was 
regarded as very unlikely that politically acceptable private buyers will 
emerge. 
15 
The Nambale ginnery was•first purchased from the Asian owners by CLSMB, which 
sold it immediately to Nambale FCU Ltd. The last Asian ginnery in Western Kenya, 
Kibos close to Kisumu town, was purchased by CLSMB, which still operates it as 
it was considered unviable (it has only six gins) for the cooperative takeover. 
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of the indidenization drive in the Kenyan agro-industries. It is clear 
that one of the main reasons for the formation of the cooperative cotton 
unions in Western Kenya was to speed up the takeovers of the ginneries 
from their Asian owners. After the first ever meeting of the management 
committee of the Malaba/Malakisi Union, its Chairman wrote to the Cotton 
Board that 
I am directed by the Committee of M/M FCU to inform the Board 
that the said Union wishes to purchase the Malakisi ginnery 
from the Indian owner who has for 51 years owned it against the 
wishes of the wananchi who grow cotton in the area. This 
ginnery came to being in 1922, and the Indian under the umbrella 
of the Colonial yoke, forcefully exploited wonanchi while he 
enjoyed all the .fruits of the wananchi's labour"^. 
The unions were strongly supported by the state as the future 
owners of the ginneries. In case of the Malakisi ginnery, in a letter 
in January 1973 to the Provincial Commissioner of Western Province, the 
Cotton Board confirmed the state's support for the cooperative ownershijj 
by declaring that 
the Board's policy is that the ginnery in Malakisi should be 
17 owned by cooperative societies in Bungoma and Busia districts 
This support was reiterated some time later, when the previous 
owner of the ginnery found a willing buyer for the ginnery in another 
private Asian businessman. This deal was resisted by the Government, on 
whose behalf the Provincial Commissioner of the Western Province wrote 
to the Asian owners informing them that 
(l)t is advised to halt negotiations of the sale of part or whole 
(of the Malakisi complex) to any other but the body appointed by 
the Government 
\ 
CWith this state support and with loans from the Cooperative Bank 
\ of Kenya Ltd, all private ginneries in Western Kenya became co-
1 operative-owned (and the Kibos ginnery CLSMB-owned) before the 
( end of the 1970's. 
"^Letter from the Chairman of M/M FCU to the General Manager of CLSMB, 
12.9.1973. 
1 7 • 1 Letter from the Chairman, the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board to 
the Provincial Commissioner of the Western Province, dated January 1973. 
The Board also ruled out in this letter any plans of building of a new 
ginnery in the area for the cooperative union. 
Letter from the PC, Western Province, to PDM Ltd, 22.2.1975. 
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Table 1: Data on Cotton Cooperative Unions in Western Kenya 
Union Founded No. of Membership Average cotton 
societies No. of farmers produced jb-88 bales 
Luanda FCU 1972 6 10.000 3.600 
Nambale FCU 1966 9 11.300 2.650 
Siaya DCU 1971* I1* 12.000 
Rachuonyo FCU 1965 11 20.000 2.632 
Victoria FCU 1965 19 10.000 2.252 
Source: KNFC and CLSMB reports. 
The main economic activity of the above cooperative unions during 
the period 1976-198^ was the ginning of seed cotton in their own ginnery 
and the related seed cotton buying activity. Additional activities under-
taken by these unions are similar in all of them: they operated seasonal 
credit schemes with funds loaned from the Cooperative Bank; they ran farm 
input stores; and operated lorries to transport the seed cotton and the 
farm inputs. It is fair to say that their existence as economic units 
depended entirely on their performance as parts of the cotton industry. 
B Viability of cooperative ginneries 
The starting point in this analysis is the assessment of the via-
bility of ginning in these five cooperative ginneries in Western Kenya. 
We are using the data of cost and revenue structures of these ginneries 
which is principally drawn from the income and expenditure records at the 
unions and from reports by the M0CD, CBK, the Cotton Board and the Cotton 
Development Project personnel. The interest costs on the ginnery 
acquisition loans and the depreciations are not included, when the contri-
q vH^fcj-a^L-
butions from these factories are mSSSS&bb*. The estimated costs and 
revenues per bale of average AP./BR lint processed are shown in Table 2 
below. 
It is obvious that much of the information on which the above 
ginnery contribution projections are based on is of doubtful accuracy, 
as it is drawn from the books of these unions which we shall below show 
to be badly kept. However, the above break-even points are so low com-
pared to what has been produced during the years 197^-1988 that it is 
justifiable to state that under proper managerial and financial control 
a3.1 the above cooperative ginneries would have been potentially viable 
economic units and capable of generating cash surpluses to support the 
development of the unions' activities. 
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TABLE 2, Cost and Revenue Structures of Five Coop. Ginneries 
(Shs/Bale) Luanda Siaya Victoria Rachuonyo Nambale 
Ginning Commission 610.15 5^0.38 606.3*+ 6oU.95 602.6U 
Variable costs: 
- direct labour 83.70 50.00 50.00 ' 60.00 75.00 
- materials 53.58 1+8.16 57.19 57.19 55.00 
- spare parts 232.70 200.00 150.00 100.00 150.00 
- oils & greases 27.36 27.00 30.00 80.00 65.00 
Contribution 
margin: 212.81 215.22 319.15 307.76 257.61+ 
Ginnery fixed 
costs p/a, Kshs: 285.000 325.000 235.000 385.000 1+1+0.000 
Break-even, bales: 1.337 1.505 736 1.251 1.708 
Average annual 
output 197^-1988, bales of lint 3.600 2.1+06 2.252 2.632 2.650 
C Financial performance 
Based en the above comments on the potential viability of these 
ginneries we now look at the accumulated financial results the unions 
have achieved from the time they took over the ginneries in the mid 1970's, 
up to the year 198H. As the ginning and related cotton buying activities 
are the only major operations of these unions, the summarized statements 
of affairs of the unions reflect accurately their performance as a part 
of the cotton industry. Table 3 below presents these statements of 
affairs in these five unions as at the end of the year 1981+. 
In the Table 3 below, each of the unions is shown to be insolvent. 
If they would be called upon to settle all outstanding current liabilities, 
they would be unable to do so without liquidating fixed assets. These 
fixed assets consist in each union almost solely of their ginnery and 
the associated land. 
Furthermore, the majority of the current .assets consist at each 
union of farm input loans to the member societies, balanced by the short 
term loans to CBK. As we shall show later in more detail, very little 
of these funds have ever been recovered by the unions from the farmers or 
cooperative societies; all are many years overdue; and the prospects for 
future recovery are extremely doubtful. In addition to these loans, each 
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Table 3: Summarized Statement of Affairs, Five Cotton Unions 
Luanda Siaya Victoria Rachuonyo Nambale 
(Kshs) (Kshs) (Kshs) (Kshs) (Kshs) 
Fixed Assets U.361.895 2.595.631 3.051.300 3.266.255 2.215.870 
Investments 170.900 132.825 123.800 152.600 172.800 
1*. 532.795 2.728.1*56 3.175.100 3.^18.825 2.388.670 
Curr. Assets 
Stocks 1.1+20.678 735.^13 1+1+0.968 1+81.539 567.552 
Member loans 3.1+65.892 9.233.570 6.216.716 10.219.1+27 3.27I+.67I+ 
Debtors 208.3I+8 816.527 2.05I+.1U9 927.835 380.1+62 
Other 231.726 1+9.111+ 32.520 30.678 11.016 
5.326. 6Ui+ 10.83;+.62lt 8.7^ 1+. 353 11.659.509 U. 233.701+ 
Total Assets 9.859.1+39 13.563.080 11.919.1+53 15.078.331+ 6.622.31b 
Current Liab. 
Short loans 2.1+80.565 9.81+5.389 8.979.081 12.it31.011+ l*.010.615 
Creditors 838.1+1+8 1*77.886 1.631.088 235.675 2.129.'+23 
CLSMB 2.210.536 1.758.091+ 7U1.0I+9 3.873.80b 1+.123.865 
Other 636.350 1+8.1+78 299.9'H 72.219 362.751+ 
Total Liab. 6 .165.899 12.129.81*7 ll.62lt.159 l6.6l2.7lU 10.626.657 
Net Assets/ 
(Liabilities) 3.693.5^0 1.1*33.233 295.29U (l.53l*.38o) 1+.001+.283 
Source: Unions' financial records. 
union is owing substantial amounts long overdue to the Cotton Board. Al-
though all these unions have been insolvent from the late 1970's, only 
Victoria Union has reached a stage, where all its movable assets were sold 
in an auction in 1981*, and the ginnery was closed down for a whole season. 
However, Victoria Union's financial status has not been incomparable with 
that of the other cooperative cotton unions in Western Kenya. They have 
all been for years 'technically bankrupt', as the auditors stated of 
Rachuonyo Union in their statement in 1985 (page 7). 
After noting above the dismal financial performance of these unions 
with cotton ginneries, we shall now look at the causes for these develop-
ments first in the fields of general and financial management, and then in 
the technical running of the ginneries. 
D Management performance 
As a starting point here we would emphasize that the demands of 
the ginnery management are not exceptionally heavy. The prices for most 
inputs and outputs are fixed, and the Cotton Board buys all lint and seed 
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regardless of the ginning quality. Principally the whole question is 
about supervising that the resources are used efficiently in ginning of 
seed cotton, and the supporting systems to farmers are properly organized, 
and adequate records are kept on all levels. Against this background I 
feel convinced to argue that we have found adequate evidence to demonstrate 
that all of the above unions have clearly failed in their management 
effort in the years 1976-1981+. I base this argument on five points con-
cerning the management of the unions and on our comments in the next sub-
section regarding their ginning performance. 
First, the whole management attitude and the way the planning and 
control of operations were organized, seem to have been unsuitable for 
modern agro-industrial enterprises. In the case of the worst of the 
unions, Victoria Union, the investigation team of the MOCD reported after 
the 1981+ financial collapse flatly that 'the Union's financial base had 
been eroded due to mismanagement and misappropriation'. Hie same problems 
of organizing the management have been visible in the other unions, too. 
In case of Luanda Union, the auditors report of 1981+ comments that 
(t)here is a distinct lack of clear communication lines and co-
ordination between sections... The activities of the Union are 
managed in day-to-day basis... The freedom of the manager to act 
in the best interest of the ginnery is at times restricted by 
19 the influences of the Management committee 
The general findings of my own observations on the management 
style in these unions can be summarized with a comment on Nambale 
Union: 
Managerially, the Union is weak. NFCU's financial results show 
no evidence of effective planning or control. Partly as a result 
of the Union's chronic cash shortage, and consequent inability to 
pay its employees regularly, the key managerial positions are 
2 0 either vacant or are filled by low calibre staff .• 
Second, this general managerial weakness has eroded the managerial 
systems in each of the unions. It was very difficult to get accurate in-
formation of their activities, as accounting and recording systems have 
1 9 DH & SMC 1985 audit report of Luanda Union, pp.- 17-10. 
PO DH & SMC 1986 audit report, p: k. 
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been poorly organized. In a slightly better managed union, Luanda Union, 
due to weaknesses in management (of the union), the union had failed 
to keep proper books of accounts and exercise proper financial control 
21 and as a result profits are not realized 
Amongst the main problems in this union, the following shortcomings 
could be noticed: 
(i) a failure for many years to carry out reconciliations of key 
accounts; 
(ii) inclusion as assets of items which did not belong to the union; 
(iii) a general lack of understanding of accounting procedures among 
clerical staff; 
(iv) a lack of unit prices for most stocks:, and 
22 (v) accumulated mispostings over many years"". 
This type of major errors and inconsistencies could be found to be 
repeated in all these five unions. In Siaya, due to lack of adequate 
documentation, brought about partly by the absence of any organized fil-
ing system, it was difficult to follow many major records at all. More 
specifically, as stated in Siaya Union Audit Report, January 1985 (p.6-
7), there are a number of balancing figures in the union's books which 
render the whole system very uncertain. No accounts were produced by 
January 1985 for the years 1982-1981+. In many accounts, the opening 
balances at the start of financial years were missing, as they could not 
he.ve been agreed on. No reconciliations have been carried out in this 
union for many years. The reasons for this state of affairs can be partly 
related to the lack of suitable experienced accounting staff, but the 
fault must have lain also with an apparent absence of laid down procedures 
for the staff to follow and the failure of the management to insist that 
certain basic accounting standards should have been maintained. These 
last points applied to all five unions. 
Third, it is obvious that the unions' management has paid very 
little attention to financial control in each of the unions. In 1983 
21 Auditors' report, November 1981+, p: 18. 
22 Survey data and Auditors report, May 1981+, p: 1. 
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it was noted, concerning these unions that 
some ginning advances issued by CLSMB to the unions are utilized for 
unions' activities that have no relationship to the ginning activity. 
Wo financial control was evident despite the fact that the MOCD has 
a supervisory role on unions' finances... A sense of financial dis-
23 ciplme is lacking for most union management committees 
F'ourth, and related to all three issues mentioned above, it became 
obvious during this research that the performance of these unions in 
administrating the farm input loans schemes has been quite disastrous. It 
must be mentioned as an excuse for the unions that these schemes were 
started without proper guidelines and an adequate training component by 
the Kenya Government and the donor agencies in the mid 1970's. Even 
against this background the performance of these unions in these schemes 
has been rather dismal. Table b sbelow shows the summary of present out-
standing balances of these unions in these loans schemes. 
Table U: Farm input loans schemes in cotton unions, outstanding balances 
as at 30.U.1989. 
Union Luanda Siaya Victoria Nambale Rachuonyo 
Kshs 3.299.19b ll.9Ul.952 ll.26l.7Ul U.1*1(3.317 lU. 751.710 
Source: The Cooperative Bank of Kenya Ltd, loans records. 
The total outstanding for these unions was Kshs 1+5.698.51^, which, 
because of the interest accrued, is more than was released to the unions. 
All of it is for many years overdue and considered also by the auditors 
not to be recoverable. Reasons for this state of affairs became obvious 
during this study. A field report in the Cooperative Bank states simply 
that 
Siaya Union lacks all effective management and control in its loans 
2b section. Book-keeping is non-existent in farmers' loans 
More or less the same could be repeated in case of all the other 
unions. Recovery procedures have been ineffective and the credit sections 
poorly managed. However, this is not the whole reason for the non-repay-
ment of these loans. Between 1976-1978 Rachuonyo Union did not remit to 
23 ' Report on Study of Co-ooerative and Board Owned Ginneries, 1983, p: 3U. 
2b CBK loans officer's field report, 9.6.1979. 
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the Cooperative Bank funds it had recovered from the farmers to the value of Kshs 
25 558.288. It used the funds for union's overheads . The same took place in the 
other unions, too. Siaya Union retained Kshs 519.806,95 "between 1976 and 197&, 
26 
and Victoria union Kshs 960.9^3,50 during the same period . All this was of 
course illegal and eroded the Cooperative Bank's confidence in these unions and 
deteriorated the farmers' chances to improve their cotton yields. The MOCD proved 
to be too weak to prevent these practices, and its weakness was still more evident 
concerning our last point in this issue. This is the role the local politicians 
and also the union officers played in actively discouraging the farmers in the loan 
repayment. The loans were explained to be 'Government funds' or 'Nairobi money', and 
that the non-repayment would not be punished. As written in a report in 1980: 
It is an open secret that farmers are encouraged (by politicians and cooperative 
leaders) not to repay as the loans might be written off. The union has made no 27 effort to recover loans' . 
According to the findings of this study, the treatment of farmers loans schemes 
in the cotton unions in Western Kenya deteriorated radically the unions' reputation as 
viable agro-industrial business units. This factor has also clearly reduced the 
cotton yields and the seed cotton supply from the area since the early 1980's, as 
the farm input credit schemes have since then been in almost total standstill because 
of the overdue loans. There may have been short-term gains to individual farmers 
or unions' officials from these schemes and from the general mismanagement of the 
unions, but in the long-term the above described processes greatly reduced the 
chances of these unions to survive as independent agro-industrial business organ-
izationss. 
Our fifth comment is more linked to the cooperative ownership mode in 
general than to the cotton unions in particular. This concerns the accounting, 
planning and reporting systems of any cooperative union or society in Kenya. These 
systems were and are designed primarily for the marketing cooperatives to take 
care of their members' produce selling and farm input buying activities. Through 
the purchase of the ginneries the cotton unions became, however, agro-industrial 
concerns, which require management and accounting systems which should do more 
than this. The cooperative accounting systems serve very poorly such tasks as the 
provision of financial and non-financial data on factories' performance-, the re-
cording of commercial liabilities; the bookkeeping of spare parts and finished and 
\Ai jy^ nicb otv<crzy?4 > 
un-finishea products; as well as the controlling the unions' 'operations',were 
trained only in cooperative accounting, they were poorly equipped to assist the 
unions in systems development and also showed clear resistance to any changes. This 
issue is definitely a handicap for any cooperative aiming at industrial operations 
in Kenya. 
25 CBK field officer's report, 29.8.1978. 
26 CBK field officer's report, 15.9.1979 and 8.5.1979. 
27 CBK field officer's report, U.11.1980. 
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E Ginning performance 
Lat us now look at the efficiency of ginning in diffsrent types 
of ginneries in Kenya. To express it shortly, the idea of ginning is to 
got as much lint as possible from seed cotton without destroying or losing 
the cotton seeds, and to do this as fast as possible and with as low costs 
as possible. We shall use two different criteria in comparing the 
technical performances of the ginneries. First, when seed cotton is 
ginned, the output should be 67% of cotton seed and 33% of lint per each 
Kilo of seed cotton ginned, There will, however, always be losses during 
the ginning process and the above mentioned percentages are never 
achieved. The percentage, which is wasted of each kilo of seed cotton 
ginned, is a good indicator for the efficiency of the ginning process, 
and efficiency in the waste management is one of the keys for good profits 
as the ginneries are paid by the kilos of lint ginned- In Table 5 below 
we show the average percentages of waste in ginning in different types of 
ginneries in Kenya during the period 1976-1904, 
Table 5; Waste management in Kenyan ginneries: Estimates for 
average percentages of waste in 1976-1984 
Waste % 
Cooperative ginneries 1,5 - 1.6% 
Board ginneries 1„0 - 1.2% 
Private ginneries 0,8 - 0.9% 
O G Source: Compiled from the CLSMB Technical Services Section records , 
These differences in the waste performances are clear indications of 
differences in the management efficiencies in these ginneries. As they 
directly effect the revenue level of these factories, they would in a 
competitive market give a decisive advantage to the private and Board-
owned ginneries. Hov^er, in Kenya, another indicator describes 
differences in performanace even more clearly. This is the number of bales 
of lint each ginnery can produce from each of its gin stands in a given ' 
period of time. This is of course a key indicator for efficiency and 
profitability, as the faster the ginnery can process the supplied seed 
cotton from its area, the bigger will be the difference between its 
commission and its costs„ The main element making the difference is the 
2 8 The data collection and storing systems in the Cotton Lint and Seed Market-
ing Board rank down to the bottom of thosa produce boerds I havu visited in 
Kenya. The Board has not published annuel reports for many years-
Concerning the performance of ginneries, I could not trace any publications 
or oven internal reports comparing t h g 1 g i n n e r i e s . Infor-
tion in this section is compiled f roirVginnary\t-J l" r ' -inaiii<n ri n I'-111'' y i nilTH 
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wages, as the labour force is employed in all ginneries for the whole 
ginning season, and dismissed immediately after the ginning is completed,, 
Table 6 below shows the number of bales of lint Kenyan ginneries produced 
per week and per ginstand during the seasons 19Q4/65 and 1985/6. 
Table 6: Time efficiency in Kenyan Ginneries 1984-1986 




['lalaki si 3.9 3.6 
Ndere 6.1 5.7 
Luanda 5.8 3.7 
Noma Bay 2.9 5.5 
Kendu Bay 5.4 7.3 
Nambale 4.9 5.2. 
Aver. Cooperative 4.8 5.2 
Board Ginneries: 
Mwea 12.2 4.6 
rieru n/a 4.8 
Hola 0.6 n/a 
Aver. Board 10.4 4.7 
Private ginneries; 
Lamu 12.5 11.4 
Malindi 12.4 n/a 
Kitui n/a 6.6 
Aver. Private 12.5 9.0 
Source: Compiled from weekly and monthly ginning reports, CLSMB files. 
Working in two shifts a day, the cooperative ginneries produced 
an average 5 bales of lint per ginstand per week during this period. The 
same average for the Board-owned factories was 7.6 bales and for the 
private operators 10.0 bales. We argue that together with our earlier 
comments on the financial management, this explains much of the situation 
where the private and to lesser extent, the Board-owned ginneries have been 
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able to operate profitable in Kenya, and the cooperative ones have produced 
continuous losses. The reasons behind these differences in efficiency can 
also be easily detected. The downtime because of maintenance, breakdowns, 
lack of spares and oils, and sometimes for power failures is much bigger 
in the cooperative ginneries. This again is related to the way these 
factories are managed. A technical ginning report on the cooperative 
ginneries states that 'what has been missing is the general ability to 
cope with day to day problems, future programming and perhaps leadership. 
Maintenance on a programme schedule has been sadly lacking, and in many 
29 cases there has been no programme at alj " '. During 1983/04 season, the 
cooperative ginnery in Ndere lost 22.2% of its ginning time because of 
30 
lack of spares and oil . For the cooperative Kendu Bay ginnery, a report 
states simply that "Ginnery dirty. Four gins not working. Gins that were 
working, not working very well. Shafts not aligned properly, bearings 31
loose. Loss of lint apparent '. Similar comments could be made on each 
of the cooporativo ginneries in Kenya. On the other hand, all technical 
reports on the private ginneries and most Board-owned ginneries are 
generally positive. Concerning the private ginnery in Malindi, which was 
constructed in 1932, one technical report states flatly: 'A well run 32 
factory obviously well cared for The local textile millers have also 
expressed preference for the lint from the private ginneries to the lint 
from the cooperative-owned ginneries. The Board-owned ginneries have 
further improved their performance during the past few years as a result 
of a major rehabilitation programme. 
As an overall conclusion it is reasonable to argue that the technical 
performance and production results have been weaker in the cooperative-
owned ginneries than in the Board-owned ginneries, and much weaker than 
in the private ones. This can only partly be explained by the old 
machinery in the cooperative ginneries. Much of the poor performance has 
been related to the inadequate skills arid wrong management attitudes in 
those cooperative management bodies which have had the overall 
responsibility of the running of these factories. 
V . 
29 Internal CLSMB'memo, G/11/1/77/HTS, dated July 1984 
Siaya Ginning Report 3/84. 
CLSMB technical report, 26.6.1984. 
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4 Discussion and Conclusions 
We shall in this section summarize somo of our findings based on 
the above presented evidence on the performance of the cooperative-owned 
ginneries. As we have already stated, tho industry logic in the cotton 
industry during our focal period has not been the best possible. Tho 
problems with CLSMB and tho price structure have been noted. We feel, 
however, that it is reasonable to argue, that many of the problems the 
cooperative ginneries have been facing, have been directly related to the 
cooperative ownership and management, mode, and can be analyzed separately 
from the general problems of the industry. 
We shall start our concluding argument regarding the management of 
the cooperative-owned ginneries with a comment, which is related to tho 
original raison d'etre of these unions. A large number of cotton farmers 
formed the unions, because they thought that by joining forces their needs 
in the agricultural services and especially in cotton marketing could be 
satisfied in a better way. However, when the unions purchased tho 
ginneries in the late 1970's, no serious discussion took place about the 
role of the industrial activities within these cooperatives. The very 
general 'satisfying of members' needs' approach seemed to have been 
applied as the main guiding principle in tha operations of the new plants, 
too. This state of affairs had serious implications for the unions' 
company culture, which did not adequately emphasize operational efficiency 
and good financial performance as the key objectives in the operations of 
the factories. It is argued here that at least indirectly the basic fact 
that the factories were a part of a rural cooperative organization which 
was formed to satisfy members' needs, influenced the company culture in 
such a way that high performance level was not regarded as the top 
priority in the industrial operations. Evidence of attitudes and working 
methods, which pointed to this direction, were given above in different 
connections. 
This company culture could have improved, if the owners' represent-
atives in the top management body, the management committee of the union, 
would have worked towards this target. Their norms and values 'could have 
influenced the dominating ideas in the company and encouraged practices 
which could have led to higher performance levels. Because of the very 
dispersed ownership structure of trio unions, no individual had by virtue 
of his status as an owner enough power to interfere in the decision making 
of the management committee. Even in cases of severe mistakes and obvious 
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omissions, the owners of the unions remained passive. Thus when the whole 
committee was forced out of thB office by the MOCD as in Halakisi Union 
in 1978 because of reasons related to committee members' incompetence and 
dishonesty and these reasons were informed to the general annual meeting, 
the owners returned most of the committee members back to the top 
management in the next elections. The election of the committee members 
seems to have been depending rather on issues such as the candidates' 
reputation as farmers O?. in local politics, than on merits earned in the 
management of the cooperatives or other companies. To conclude, the 
dispersed ownership structure and the election practices gave a great deal 
of power and independence to the management committeo of these cooperative 
unions. 
Why was it then that the unions and their ginneries performed so 
badly under the leadership of these management committees? The first point 
worth noting is 'the role of the industrial capabilities. The owners' 
representatives in company's/union's management normally influence the 
firm's performance by using such instruments as the defining and 
redefining the company mission and role* the selection of the top 
management} the improvement of the company culture* and the establishment 
of a company control scheme. This should be especially the case in 
companies such as the cooperative unions, where the day-by-day management 
of the union should according to the Cooperative Societies Act be in the 
hands of employed senior staff. To use the above instruments properly, the 
owners' representatives should have adequate experience of industrial 
management and of the sector where the production takes place. In the case 
of the cotton unions, the management committee members, who were mainly 
farmers or politicians, had very little experience of industrial 
operations, even if they were to some extont familiar with the cotton 
sector in general. Judging from our study results, their ability to 
understand, what was needed in the management of the acquired factories, 
was limited. Yet the members of the committee did not limit their role to 
such activities as the strategic decision making, but were shown to have 
participated actively also in the daily management of the union. It has 
been shown that this combination of active participation and lack of 
competence had a serious detrimental impact on financial and operational 
performance of these unions. 
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A company/union can function successfully, oven if the board of 
directors/management committee lacks competence, if good employed senior 
staff can compensate for the deficiencies in the top management level. In 
the case of these cooperative unions also the employed senior and middle 
level staff had little experience of the management of industrial 
activities and of operating the necessary management systems. This 
situation was a result of such factors as the general small .number of 
experienced persons for this type of jobs in Western Kenya, the management 
committee's insistence to employ the staff from certain tribal and zonal 
base, and the low maximum salaries stated by the (Ministry of Cooperative 
Development. The total result of this state of affairs for the unions was 
that both the management committee members and the senior staff lacked 
skills, which would have been necessary for succossful management of 
ginneries. If this type of industrial investment had been made by private 
investors in Kenya, it is plausible to argue that in order to safeguard 
their investment, the investors would have tried to introduce more 
industrial competence either to tho board of directors or to the employed 
senior management, than was the case in these cooperative unions. Iri this 
respect the chances for sustained good industrial performance might have 
been better under another ownership mode, where returns to owners from 
industrial operations would have been more directly linked to industrial 
competence and high performance level, than was the case under the 
cooperative ownership structure. 
Our next comment concerns the impact of the state participation 
to the affairs of these cooperative unions. According to Kenya's legislation 
and especially the Cooperative Societies Act, the .Ministry of Cooperative 
Development has tjne authority to exorcise control over the affairs of the 
cooperative unions. This control is officially justified both from the 
monitoring and promotion points of view. Our evidence on the poor 
technical performance and the relaxed controls in the unions would suggest 
that .in its monitoring and controlling role the MOCD has played a rather 
weak role in the cooperative cotton unions. The management committees of 
the unions, especially if they have had political power vested in them, 
have managed in many critical cases to resist the interference by the 
MOCD. Whether some other form of state participation, such as a per-
manent seat in the management committees of the unions, would have produced 
more efficient control, would be a subject that would need further research. 
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From the point of view of the promotion of the unions' industrial 
activities, the role of the P10CD during this research period raises some 
doubts. The industrial capabilities of the civil servants in this ministry 
appear to have been rather limited. The accounting systems, which the MOCD 
i 
staff insisted on implementing, were not suitable for the industrial 
activities. To conclude, the evidence of this study would suggest that the 
hOCD's intervention in the cotton unions' industrial affairs has not been 33 very successful from either controlling or promotion points of view 
What Ware then the benefits from the industrial operations of 
these cooperative unions to the small-scale farmers, who were the owners of 
the factories through their cooperative societies, and who had partly financed 
the original purchases of the ginneries with deductions from their crop 
payments? No financial dividends were issued to the farmers -from the 
struggling unions since the take-over of ginneries, and the profits are 
seldom distributed in this way in any cooperative in Kenya. Our evidence 
would suggest that also the level of services to the farmers greatly 
deteriorated during our focal period, and this situation was partly linked 
to the way the unions managed their industrial operations. The poor 
financial control and recording practices lad finally to the almost total 
closedown of seasonal credit schemes, and this contributed to the poor 
yields in cotton production. By using in various cases farmers' cotton 
payment funds for the payment of the commercial creditors the unions 
directly caused hardships for the small-scale farmers in the area. To 
balance these clear negative effects on their living conditions, the 
farmers may have felt satisfaction of the knowledge that the processing 
factories were in their ownership and not controlled by a small number of 
individuals who would 'enjoy the fruits of tfelt farmers' labour' as was 
quoted earlier in this paper. Our evidence would indicate that for this 
This situation is closely related to the question of 'immature' 
state and the impact of such state intervention to the economic 
processes. For further discussion on this subject, see G. White's 
book on this topic. 
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balancing satisfaction tho farmers had to pay a fairly high price. This 
subject would lead us to a wider discussion of the realism of different 
developmefcrV concepts in the indigenization theories and policies and to 
the problems of the 'democratic' or 'farmer-based' ownership structures? 
as well as to tha dilemma of the distribution of potential profits in a 
just way in this type of activities involving a large number of low income 
farmers and their families. These interesting subjects will be discussed 
in our forthcoming papers. 
We have noted that the 1988 Cotton Act gives a big role to the 
cooperative unions and societies in the future structure of this industry 
in Kenya. The evidence of this study would suggest that caution should be 
exercised as the policies of the new act are implemented in practice. The 
inherent weaknesses of the cooperative ownership and management modes in 
industrial activities should be taken into consideration, before making 
final decisions concerning the policies to revive Kenya's ailing cotton 
sector. 
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APPENDIX 1: SEED COTTON PRODUCTION IN KENYA BY PROVINCE 1965-1988 (TONS) 
YEARS WESTERN NYANZA SHARE OF COAST CENTRAL+ TOTAL BALES 
PROVINCE NYANZA+ EASTERN- PRODUCTION OF 
WESTERN RIFT TONS LINT 
OF TOTAL VALLEY 
1965/66 3.282 2.732 44.4% 3.779 3.562 13.555 23.430 
1966/67 5.570 2.732 74.0% 1.866 1.678 13.632 23.915 
1967/6B 3.480 4.517 63.1% 1.645 2.593 11.441 20.072 
1968/69 5.152 1.856 53.4% 1.381 4.039 13,127 23.029 
1969/70 4.944 2.719 48.4% 1,907 6.248 15.819 27.752 
1970/71 7.707 3.751 66.5% 2.896 2.875 17.230 30.228 
1971/72 7.242 3.296 63.7% 4.244 1.758 16.540 29.017 
1972/73 5.921 3.317 53.6% 4.763 3.217 17.220 30.210 
1973/74 6.926 1.687 53.2% 3.254 4.317 16.183 28.892 
1974/75 7.289 2.130 64.7% 3.062 3.789 14.560 25.544 
1975/76 8.576 3.649 68.0% 3,907 2.332 17.985 31.553 
1976/77 10.534 2.714 66.9% 4.050 6,497 19.806 34.747 
1977/76 6.969 6.028 48.7% 3.253 9.034 26.714 46.867 
1978/79 8.577 6.978 43.9% 2.929 17.082 35.442 62.179 
1979/80 9.413 7.075 56.4% 2.849 9.875 29.213 51.250 
1980/81 5.940 7.776 51.2% 4.366 8.710 26.783 46.987 
1981/82 5.782 6.373 50.1% 4.890 7.043 24.256 42.557 
1982/83 2.661 5.246 33.6% 3.888 11.735 23.501 42.053 
1983/84 2.638 2.650 35.5% 4.314 5.270 14.872 26.025 
1984/85 3.392 3.717 17.8% 9.124 23.712 39.945 70.421 
1985/86 3.468 5.537 32.4% 9.811 8.951 27.767 49.107 
1986/87 3.291 2.816 31.8% 8.270 4.808 19.185 33.975 
1987/88 1.903 1.219 16.6% 8.907 6.755 18.784 32.896 
Source: CLSMB, Marketing Section Records. 
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APPENDIX PRODUCER PRICE FOR SEED COTTON BASED ON EXPORT PARITY 
FOR THE 1985/86 PRODUCER PRICE OF KSHS•5,-/KG 
34 World Price 
Transport and trading 
Cotton Varieties 
Premium over world price 
Fob Mombasa Price 
Fob Mombasa Price (US$=Kshs 0.15: 
Port costs 
0.74 US $ per lb 
BPA(irr) 
0 . 09 
0,75 














Transport and Storage of 
lint ex-godown 
Ginning fee 
Proceeds from sales of 35 cotton seed 




- Cotton services 
- Interest costs 
- Other overhead 
Export Parity Producer Price (lint! 
Export Parity Producer Price 
Seed Cotton (33% of lint price) 
Weighted overage (60% UKA, 
































Source: 1984/85 Agricultural Price Review - Seed Cotton. 
34 World market price derived from the Cotton Outlook (October 1984). 
36 These are added, not deducted, 
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APPENDIX 3: COTTON GROWING MARGINS PER HECTARE., 
WESTERN AND NYANZA PROVINCES . 















Cotton AR kg 




160 800 1350 6750 
40 98 150 368 
TOTAL GROSS OUTPUT 
VARIABLE COSTS 
Cotton seed (kgs) 0.00 
Cypermethrin 
Ec. 5% (litres) 216.45 
Transport/Mkting 0.10 
Cost of hired 
machinery 
Total variable costs 




Weeding 3 times 
Spraying 5 times 
Picking @ 50 cts/kg 
Grading @ 50 cts/kg 
Transport to nearest buying 
center @ 10 cts/kg 





































MARGIN AFTER LABOUR COSTS (1217) 
Source: Compiled from CLSMB Production Section's Cotton Production Reports. 
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APPENDIX 4: COSTS ANO YIELDS IN TOBACCO PRODUCTION: 
WESTERN AND NYANZA PROVINCES 
Based on 1984/85 prices 
COST OF PRODUCTION PER HALF HECTARE 
Variable costs excluding labour Kshs 
Chemicals 400.00 
Fertilizer 800.00 
Flue pipes 800.00 
Other costs 400.00 
Total 2.400.00 
YIELD PER HALF HECTARE 
AVERAGE 700 KG TOBACCO g 12.00/KG 8.400.00 
MARGIN PER HALF HECTARE EXC. LABOUR 6.000.00 
Source: District Crops Officer,, Bungoma District and BAT, Malakisi Office. 
Note: A) Labour costs in land preparation similar to cottonn other 
labour costs slightly higher than in case of high input cotton. 
B) For each half acre of tobacco, at least similar area must be 
planted with trees, as the curing of tobacco consumes a large 
amount of the very scarce firewood. 
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APPENDIX 5: KENYA COTTON GINNERIES 
PROVINCE/ 
GINNERY 
DATA FOR THE YEAR 1989 
OWNERSHIP NO. OF 
GINS 
POSSIBLE OUT-






Victoria Coop. Union 
Rachuanyo Coop. Union 
Cotton Board 














Luanda Coop. Union 16 
Nambale Coop. Union 12 













Private : Jiwazi arid 
Zaveri Families 
50% Cotton Board, 
























Source: CLSMB Technical Services Section Records, and on Ownership: 
Registrar General's Dffice. 
36 Single Roller ginnery, which lowers the capacity. 
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APPENDIX 6: COTTON LINT PRODUCTION BY GINNERY IN KENYA 1974-1988 















1. Meru - - - 685 4617 6292 3782 
2. Mwea 4120 1307 4167 6203 8926 3241 2202 
3. Makueni - - - - 4950 3299 5252 
4. Kitui 2518 2784 6908 11469 11092 4493 4046 
5. Ho la - - - 2500 2441 2206 2969 
6. Lamu 3995 4525 183 262 398 455 1230 
7. Malindi 1376 2329 6922 2935 2299 2337 3445 
8. Kibos - - - 1470 1333 2362 3468 
9. Ndere 933 2057 1852 2745 3145 3142 4149 
10. Homa-Bay - - - 2484 3676 3468 2405 
11. Kendu Bay 2804 4344 1735 3866 4490 3441 3620 
12. Salawa - - - - - - -
13. Luanda 3572 6756 3661 3292 4893 4415 5592 
14, Nambole 3652 3398 2956 3346 4965 5124 1296 
15. Malakisi 5565 4032 4863 5589 5338 6475 3534 















.1, Meru 3803 7912 6645 11349 4975 3549 2306 
2. Mwea 1854 4041 958 12657 3101 1043 611 
3. Makueni - 5890 3002 10146 32.68 2090 1316 
4. Kitui 2630 3577 1275 7279 2708 1332 1134 
5. Hola - 2562 3018 5678 3616 6405 4155 
6, Lamu 639 313 1062 2615 3616 1961 4400 
7. Malindi 7238 3922 3622 8000 10770 6402 10685 
8. Kibos 2017 2017 2000 1907 1049 2606 276 
9. Ndere 2527 2273 1102 2785 3150 - -
10. Homa-Bay 4230 809 - 2053 1413 1413 1000 
11.q Kendu Bay 2406 2818 1631 968 2836 1010 1050 
12. Salawa - - - 40 1539 208 275 
13. Luanda 3931 3193 2793 2981 2380 1699 1236 
14. Nambale 2696 770 1031 1758 2155 2697 1255 
15. Malakisi 3487 706 887 1319 1658 1480 903 
TOTAL 33270 40757 29027 70147 49187 33975 30632 
Source: CLSMB Technical Services Section Ginning Records. 
